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“Canada consents to enter Copyright Convention.”2 These six words, sent by Canada’s 
Prime Minister in reply to the British government’s inquiries as to the willingness of 
the colonial governments to enter the Berne Convention, masked domestic tension that 
surrounded the issue of copyright in Canada. Canada would follow Britain into the 
Berne Convention but Canada, as a British dominion and, eventually, a middle power, 
would have a very different story from other, more familiar, copyright histories. 
Canada’s path crossed hidden fault lines that would later appear in the political map of 
international copyright.  
Current mappings of the politics of international copyright – alignments that classify 
the various copyright interest groups – tend to mask the tensions within these 
categories. Such categories and classifications have a powerful ability to mask tensions, 
to organize, to mobilize, and to shape the history of copyright.  
In this paper I will make three arguments, drawing on the historical experience of 
Canada with the Berne Convention between 1886, when the Berne Convention was 
founded, and 1971, its last revision. First, Canada, though aligned with the most 
powerful countries on issues of international copyright, has a unique and important 
history with international copyright that is very different from the histories of the 
major powers. Second, for many middle powers, the Berne Convention was a symbol of 
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progress in international law, and a hallmark of a civilized country. Canada has 
aligned with the major powers on issues of international copyright. Though this 
alignment has not always comfortable, it stems in part from a desire to be associated 
with ideas of progress and civilization, and to be aligned with one’s largest trading 
partners. Third, I ask, what contribution do middle powers make to the international 
copyright system today?  
I 
CANADA’S COPYRIGHT HISTORY IS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF 
THE MAJOR POWERS  
Canada’s historical experience with the Berne Convention has been very different from 
the experiences of the major powers. Like many of today’s middle powers, Canada 
signed on to the international copyright treaty in 1886 not as an independent country 
but as a British colony. Canada had no foreign affairs institutions or diplomats and 
was not directly represented at the founding meetings of the convention. 
Economically, unlike France or Great Britain, nineteenth-century Canada, like many 
other colonies, stood to gain little from the new international regime; Canada’s 
copyright industry was almost non-existent.  
In 1886 just 574 copyrights were registered in Canada, and, since Canadian authors 
had almost no international recognition, few Canadian authors would benefit from the 
internationally expanded copyright protection that would come about through 
Canada’s participation in the Berne Convention.3  
Competitively, the Berne Convention put Canada at a disadvantage. Canadian printing 
and publishing was in competition with the printers and publishers of the United 
States – a country that did not yet recognize international copyright. American 
publishers could reprint the works of foreign authors without permission and without 
any legal requirement to pay royalties to foreign authors. Canadian publishers, under 
the Berne Convention, would not have this freedom.  
As a result, the Canadian printing and publishing industry suffered, affecting authors 
as well.4 Although the industry was expanding – by 1881 the number of people 
employed in the industry had almost doubled since 1771, and over the next ten years 
                                                             
3 Canada. The Canada Year Book: Statistical Abstract and Record for the Year 1886, 270, 
www66.statcan.gc.ca/u?/eng,17565; George L. Parker, "The Evolution of Publishing in Canada" In 
History of the Book in Canada, eds. Patricia Fleming, Yvan Lamonde and Fiona A. Black, Vol. 2 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 17–26.  
4 William Kirby to John A. Macdonald, 24 March 1885. In Prime Minister Macdonald fonds 
(MG26 A), pages 61277 to 61281. Library and Archives Canada. 
81 
employment in the industry would grow by 30%5 – it was also seen to be struggling. 
Novelist and journalist William Kirby argued, in an 1885 letter to Canadian Prime 
Minister Macdonald, that his concern was “not primarily to secure copyright to 
Canadian authors – they have plenty of that,” but to “give our publishing industries 
such fair play and protections as they might obtain or the trade will become extinct in 
Canada.”6  
Nineteenth-century Canada’s strides towards independence from Britain in foreign 
affairs were slow and gradual. By 1886 there was an increasing trend for Canada to 
send representatives to international negotiations, and it was established that British 
colonies were to be consulted on matters of international treaties.7 However, 
consultation with Canada and the other British colonies, in the case of the initial 
negotiations for the Berne Convention, was minimal, and no Canadian representative 
accompanied the British delegation at the founding meetings of the Berne Convention. 
On 9 September, the British delegates signed the Berne Convention, making the 
following declaration:  
Plenipotentiaries of Her Britannica Majesty state that the accession of Great 
Britain to the Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works 
comprises the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and all the 
Colonies and Foreign possessions of Her Britannica Majesty.  
At the same time, they reserve to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty the power 
of announcing at any time the separate denunciation of the Convention by one or 
several of the following Colonies or possessions in the manner provided for by Article 
XX of the Convention, namely: India, the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the 
Cape, Natal, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia, 
Western Australia, and New Zealand.8  
There was a conflict at the root of Canada’s position as a party, under Britain, to the 
new convention – one that would disturb and threaten the new Union. While the 
                                                             
5 Éric Leroux, "Printers: From Shop to Industry" In History of the Book in Canada, eds. Patricia 
Fleming, Yvan Lamonde and Fiona A. Black, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2004), 75–87.Canada. Census of Canada, 1870–71, Volume 3, Table LV – Summary of Industrial 
Establishments, by Provinces. 
6 William Kirby to John A. Macdonald, 24 March 1885. In Prime Minister Macdonald fonds 
(MG26 A), pages 61277 to 61281. Library and Archives Canada. 
7 David M. L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 1867–1887 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1955), 234–235. 
8 Francis Adams and J.H.G Bergne to the Earl of Iddelsleigh. Report on the Third International 
Copyright Conference at Berne. 10 September 1886. In RG6 A3 Vol. 214 File “Copyright 
Conference at Berne, 1886.” Library and Archives Canada. Emphasis added. 
82 
Canadian government moved to make Canada a part of a copyright system that was 
being portrayed as the advancement of civilization, there were also significant 
differences between Canada and the countries that initiated the Berne Convention. 
Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Germany housed major publishers 
with interests in publishing in foreign countries, while Canada was a net copyright 
importer. They were highly developed, and Canada was still developing. They had a 
flourishing literary culture; Canada did not. 
The differences between Canada and the lead countries in the movement to establish 
the Berne Convention only grew wider. Although Canada had agreed to join Berne, by 
1889 there were strong arguments that Canada should control its own copyright law, 
independently from Britain, and denounce the Berne Convention. Canada’s decision to 
join the Berne Union would soon be called an act of “profound…almost criminal – 
negligence” on the part of Canadian politicians, because the principles of the 
international agreement were out of step with what many Canadian interest groups at 
the time were calling for.9 Canada, shortly after joining the Berne Convention in 1886, 
reversed position; for years following Canada’s initial accession, Canada would 
attempt unsuccessfully to denounce the agreement. 
Canadian Minister of Justice John Thompson, who came to see the Berne Convention 
as being highly disadvantageous to Canadian interests, felt that the convention allowed 
foreign copyright holders to gain a monopoly on publishing their works in the 
Canadian market, causing Canadian printers and publishers to lose out. The benefits 
that Canadian copyright holders received under the Berne Convention did not equal, 
in Thompson’s view, the harm caused to Canadian printing and publishing industry: 
the condition of the publishing interest in Canada was made worse by the 
Berne Convention…The monopoly which was, in former years, complained 
of in regard to British copyright holders is now to be complained of, not 
only as regards British copyright holders, but as to the same class in all 
countries included in the Berne Copyright Union. Canada is made a close 
market for their benefit, and the single compensation given by the 
convention for a market of five millions of reading people is the possible 
benefit to the Canadian author…[who has been described as] “belonging 
rather to the future than to the present.”10 
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Thompson also felt that the terms of the Berne Convention largely favoured densely 
populated and highly urbanized countries such as those in Europe, but that such terms 
were unsuited to relatively less developed countries like Canada: 
The Berne Convention had in view considerations of society which are 
widely different from those prevailing in Canada. In Europe the reading 
population in the various countries is comparatively dense; – in Canada, a 
population considerably less than that of London is dispersed over an area 
nearly as large as that of Europe. In the cities of Europe, especially in Great 
Britain, the reading public is largely supplied from the libraries, while, in 
Canada, as a general rule, he who reads must buy. In European countries the 
reading class forms but a fraction of the whole population, while in Canada 
it comprises nearly the whole population.11 
Opposition to the agreement from printers, publishers, and related industries grew 
and mobilized. As a result, a Canadian copyright act was unanimously passed in 1889 
containing domestic printing requirements and a compulsory licensing system that 
were not compatible with the Berne Convention.12  
The Copyright Act of 1889 contained domestic printing requirements that were 
disallowed under the Berne Convention, which did not allow member states to require 
any formality as a condition of copyright.13 The new act required first or simultaneous 
printing and publishing in Canada – that is, printing and publishing in Canada within 
one month of publication or production elsewhere.14 Works that were not first printed 
and published in Canada or printed and published in Canada within a month of their 
publication or production elsewhere would not be eligible for the protections provided 
by Canadian copyright.  
The Copyright Act of 1889 went further. The failure to meet the domestic printing and 
publishing requirements of the act would have opened the way for the grant of 
compulsory licenses to reprint the work in Canada without permission of the 
copyright owner under compulsory licensing provisions. These compulsory licensing 
provisions, designed to make access to books more affordable in Canada, and to 
enable Canadian printers and publishers to better compete with the Americans, who 
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did not yet recognize international copyright, were also seen to be incompatible with 
the Berne Convention. Therefore Canadian Parliament, in a unanimous decision, 
requested denunciation of the Berne Convention.15  
The British, who had ultimate control both of Canadian legislation and Canadian 
foreign affairs, refused to let the Canadian act enter into force, and refused to allow 
Canada to denounce the Berne Convention. The British government was loathe to 
allow Canada to abandon the Berne Convention, as denunciation would break up the 
system of copyright uniformity throughout the British Empire. It infuriated some 
members of the British government that a colony such as Canada might threaten to 
break up the Berne Union. Henry Bergne, who had been a British delegate to the early 
meetings creating the Berne Convention, wrote: 
An International Union has only just been accomplished, with great 
difficulty, and on principles which commend themselves to the civilized 
world. To this, Great Britain and all her Colonies are parties, with the 
express and unanimous consent of the latter. Is a British colony, like 
Canada, for the sake of their infinitesimal interest in the publishing 
business, or for the supposed benefit of Canadian readers, to be the first to 
withdraw, and so to raise a hand to destroy the Union, which comprises a 
population of four or five hundred millions?16 
Bergne and others feared that if Canada were to withdraw from the Berne Convention, 
other countries would follow. A British committee studying the matter wrote that if 
“the interests of publishers or printers were allowed to prevail over those of authors, 
the lead given to Canada would not improbably be followed by other colonies, and 
thus the whole system of Imperial copyright would be broken up.”17  
Denunciation, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Knutsford informed 
Canada’s Governor General in 1890, would be unnecessary since the 1889 act 
contravening the Berne Convention would not receive the necessary approval from 
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Britain.18 British imperial power was used to forcefully keep Canada in the Berne 
Convention.  
Thompson, who became Canada’s fourth Prime Minister in 1892, was furious at this 
refusal to recognize Canadian copyright sovereignty. He wrote long letters to the 
Imperial government; he refused to meet with British representatives who came to 
negotiate on the issue, and finally he went to London to negotiate on, among other 
things, the copyright issue.19 At Windsor Castle on December 12 1894, Prime Minister 
Thompson died of a heart attack. His body was returned home to Canada in a boat 
with the sides painted black, and the dream of Canadian copyright sovereignty – and a 
copyright that differed from the norms of the Berne Convention – was never 
realized.20 
The histories of copyright that focus on major powers such as England, France, and 
the United States tell a story about copyright that is very different from Canada’s story. 
It is often assumed that Canadian copyright history has been uneventful, and that 
Canada’s association with the Berne Convention has been uncontentious and 
unproblematic. However, the Canadian history stands as a reminder that the 
international copyright system was built and held together by imperial power. The 
Canadian history reminds us of the power struggles and conflicts that were part of the 
Union’s history from the very beginning. 
It would not be long before Canada’s course in international copyright would once 
again change direction. Following World War I, perceptions of Canada and its place in 
the world shifted; Canada’s participation in the Great War meant that Canada now 
viewed itself as an independent participant in international affairs, and there were 
feelings that the rebellious copyright policies of the past might tend to make Canada 
an “outsider in the general community of nations.” 21 At the same time, Britain began 
to loosen its grip on the handlebars of Canadian copyright and, with the Canadian 
Copyright Act of 1924 Canada, under Britain, moved to implement the Berne 
Convention.  
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II 
CANADA’S ALIGNMENT WITH MAJOR POWERS ON ISSUES OF 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN EASY 
Canada used its copyright policies to gain status – to project an image of Canada as a 
“civilized country”. Although other alignments were considered, and Canada in the 
1960s and 1970s took particular note of its commonalities with the “developing” 
countries, generally Canada has aligned with the more powerful countries – afraid that 
if the country took any other route, the country would be considered as “an outlaw 
among the copyright nations of the world,”22 an “outsider in the general community of 
nations,”23 and a “non-harmonious and non-musical instrument” within the concert 
of nations.24 
Today, Canada is aligned, as a part of Group B, with the United States and the other 
industrialized countries. This was not always the case; Canada also has a history of 
copyright conflict with the US. In the nineteenth century, Canada was used as the back 
door to Berne protection for American authors who, by publishing in Canada, 
received protection throughout the Berne Union. 25 This led to a dispute between the 
two countries, with Canada refusing for some time to grant to Americans Canadian 
copyright protection.26 Later, Canada’s 1924 Copyright Act contained special 
provisions that sought to retaliate for the US manufacturing clause.27 Disputes 
continued over the manufacturing clause but were mitigated when both countries 
signed the Universal Copyright Convention in 1952. Canada’s copyright relationship 
with the US was never easy, and its association with the major powers has not been 
unproblematic. 
Canada’s acquiescence to the norms embedded in the Berne Convention, and the 
country’s alignment with the major powers on international copyright issues, had 
much to do with the association between the Berne norms of international copyright 
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and ideas of progress and civilization. For many, the Berne Convention symbolized the 
forward march of international law, civilization, and progress.28 Progress has, as 
Shanin points out, gone by various names: ‘modernization’, ‘development’, ‘growth’, 
‘civilization’.29 According to Shanin, this vision of progress portrays:  
all societies … advancing naturally and consistently “up”, on a 
root from poverty, barbarism, despotism and ignorance to riches, 
civilization, democracy and rationality, the highest expression of 
which is science. This is also an irreversible movement from an 
endless diversity of particularities, wasteful of human energies and 
economic resources, to a world unified and simplified into the 
most rational arrangement. It is therefore a movement from 
badness to goodness and from mindlessness to knowledge, which 
gave this message its ethical promise, its optimism and its 
reformist “punch”.30 
The world has thus been classified according to particular systems and ideas of 
progress – some societies and peoples as “developed”, others as “underdeveloped” – 
and some in the middle.31 These ideas have their own power alongside material 
realities; because of its powerful ability to organize, to mobilize, and to legitimize the 
actions of powerful interests and states.  
Escobar shows that the discourse of development, beginning in the 1950s, became 
universally accepted and omnipresent.32 The discourse of development, according to 
Escobar, constructs the “developing” world through conceptual maps, categories, and 
social practices.33 The discourse and categories of development have been powerful 
not only in constructing the “developing” world; they have also been influential in 
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creating conceptualizations of the “developed” world and the copyright policies and 
positions acceptable for “developed” countries.  
Just as nineteenth-century Canadian politicians grappled to identify the copyright 
policies most appropriate to the leading British colony and to a “civilized nation”, 
paddling within a sea of discourse largely generated by the international interests that 
had encouraged the creation of the Berne Union, Canadian officials in the early 1970s 
struggled to find a position on international copyright that encompassed Canada’s 
position as a net copyright importer, similar in that sense to developing countries, and 
an industrialized country aligned with some of the biggest copyright exporters. The 
weight of categorization, of commonsense notions of the type of country Canada was, 
played a significant role in the determination of what copyright policies Canada took.  
The year 1967 marked a crisis in international copyright. Newly independent 
countries, beginning in the 1960s, raised important questions about whether the Berne 
system of international copyright was appropriate to developing countries who were 
importers, rather than exporters, of copyright materials and for whom international 
copyright created a net outflow of payments. They noted the lack of availability and 
high price of copyright materials, and wished to see a copyright system that would do 
more to solve these problems.  
They called for major changes to the Berne Convention that would allow for the 
compulsory licensing of works to make foreign works available at affordable prices in 
developing countries. This led to the failure of the 1967 revision of the Berne 
Convention, with both developing and developed countries unhappy with the 
compromise that was reached.34 This crisis in the Berne Union prompted fears that 
either the core countries or the developing countries might withdraw en masse from 
the Union.35  
Scepticism about the appropriateness of the Berne Convention to countries at various 
stages of development also appeared in Canada. Beginning in the 1950s, doubts were 
raised about whether Canada had been “well advised” in joining the Berne Convention. 
The 1957 Royal Commission on Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Industrial 
Designs took the view that the Berne Convention represented a European approach to 
copyright, granting high levels of copyright and placing the rights of authors in the 
forefront. The Commission suggested that a more American approach--with a 
utilitarian view of copyright that understood copyright as serving the public interest 
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above the interests of authors--might be more suitable to Canada as a net copyright 
importer.  
The Commission reported: “It may be that, in becoming a party to the Berlin Revision 
of the Berne Convention in 1923, Canada was not too well advised. Apart from Haiti 
and Brazil no nations in the Western Hemisphere are members of the Berne 
Union…”36  
In the 1960s, following the Royal Commission’s report, Canada attended fewer 
meetings related to the Convention and its revisions, and refused to sign or implement 
the revision of 1967. Many countries refused to ratify that revision due to its 
controversial provisions for developing countries. Canada’s refusal was for different 
reasons; Canada’s prime objection was not with the provisions for developing 
countries; rather, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs questioned whether 
Canada’s participation in the Berne Convention, and the high levels of copyright 
protection granted under the convention, was in the national interest:  
Successive revisions of the Berne Convention have progressively extended 
the monopoly rights of copyright holders. The current revisions suggested 
for the [1967] Stockholm conference are intended to extend these rights still 
further. Unfortunately, this raises the question of the cost in relation to the 
value of present copyright legislation as a device for encouraging creativity 
in Canada before the Economic Council’s report is available. An important 
consideration in the study of this matter is the fact that as much as 90% of 
the total cost (about $8 million) of copyright to the public in Canada is 
accounted for by the protection given foreign works. In turn, compensation 
to Canadian authors by way of payments from overseas to Canada is 
minimal. That raises the fundamental question of whether protection of the 
kind Canada is committed to by adhering to the Berne Union is in the 
national interest.37  
The Secretary therefore recommended to Cabinet that Canada should refrain from 
supporting any proposed revision to the Berne Convention that would reduce the 
government’s flexibility of action.38 Canada did not sign the revised Berne Convention 
of 1967.39  
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At the same time, the crisis that resulted from the 1967 conference in Stockholm 
sparked a new resolve that Canada should become a more influential and active player 
within the Berne Union. Some Canadian government officials hoped that the 
discourse of development now being established within the Berne Union, having been 
absent when former colonies like Canada joined the Union, might be translated to 
apply to Canada.  
A government committee, formed in 1969 to assist in the formulation of Canada’s 
position in response to the crisis in international copyright, recommended an 
adaptation of the definition of ‘developing country’ such that Canada might benefit 
from concessions made to developing countries under the Berne Convention.40 The 
committee argued that, “Canada’s position is somewhat analogous to that of 
developing countries when compared to countries with higher exports of copyright 
material.”41 A Memorandum to Cabinet explained: 
Although Canada is undoubtedly a “developing country” in so far as 
copyright is concerned (because of the large import imbalance of trade in 
copyrighted material), nevertheless it is not so considered by the two 
Conventions. A “developing country” under U.N. definition is considered a 
country which has an average per capita income per year of $U.S. 300 or 
less. In my view [Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Stanley 
Basford], any country with a very large export-import imbalance in 
copyrighted materials should be entitled, like the developing countries, to 
maintain a somewhat lower level of international copyright protection.42 
The Memo to Cabinet recommended, “That the Canadian delegation suggest to the 
Joint Study Group that, in so far as international copyright is concerned, the definition 
of a “developing country” should not be based on per capita income, but on a 
substantial import imbalance of trade in copyrighted material.”43  
The reformulation of the concept of “developing country” in such a way as to include 
Canada was absolutely radical. Such a precedent might have opened the door to a 
variety of definitions of developing countries based on the balance of trade in different 
areas, making possible a cascade of unexpected country coalitions and policy 
alignments unthinkable under the existing categorizations. It is unsurprising that an 
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idea so radical and so different from the regimes of representation and the practices of 
categorization that were being inscribed in international institutions at the time did 
not go far; a note on file called this aspect of the committee’s recommendation “utter 
nonsense”: 
Efforts to claim Canada is a “developing country”… are usually greeted with 
derision. We have the 3rd highest per capita income in the world and this is 
partly due to our importation of capital and know-how.44 
The idea that provisions for developing countries should apply to Canada conflicted 
with the established discourse that by now placed Canada as a middle power, 
associated with industrialized countries.  
Canadian copyright policymakers in the late 1960s and early 1970s nevertheless felt 
that that international copyright, as implemented under the Berne Convention, 
primarily responded to the interests of the copyright-exporting nations. A 1977 report 
by Andrew A. Keyes and Claude Brunet in 1977 concluded that:  
the fully developed nations, largely exporters of copyright material, have a 
stronger voice in international copyright conventions, and a tendency has 
existed over the past half century for developing countries, including 
Canada, to accept too readily proffered solutions in copyright matters that 
do not reflect their economic positions.45  
As a result of such perceptions, Canada attempted to form a coalition of ‘intermediate’ 
countries who were not officially “developing” countries, but who were net copyright 
importers. Canadian government officials envisioned that Canada might “for the first 
time… play a leading role in shaping the course of international copyright by fostering 
and leading a block of countries with interests similar to Canada.” Officials felt that 
this coalition “could conceivably control a certain balance of power, given active 
participation.”46  
Canada hoped, through this vehicle, to press for major structural change to the 
international copyright system that would allow different countries--including net-
copyright importers like Canada--to adhere to different levels of copyright protection, 
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according to domestic circumstances.47 However, this initiative to redraw the political 
map of international copyright failed due to Canada’s inability to attract sufficient 
support, and due to fears that such a stance would affect Canada’s relations with 
countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and France.48  
In an effort to resolve the crisis of 1967, simultaneous diplomatic conferences were 
held in 1971 to come to a more workable compromise and to revise both the Berne 
Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention in a way that would unify, and 
prevent the breakup, of the international copyright system.49 Its radical initiatives 
having failed, Canada supported the revision process and aligned itself generally with 
the major powers. Adopting a middle power image, Canada portrayed itself at the 
1971 diplomatic conference to revise the Universal Copyright Convention not as a 
developing country, but as “both developed and developing”, an intermediary that 
understood the needs of both developing and “developed” countries:  
The delegate of Canada emphasized the great interest of his government in 
the problems of international copyright and the work of the Conference. 
This special interest arises from a combination of factors, including the 
existence within Canada of dual languages and cultures, and the problems of 
reconciling copyright protection and technological innovations in a country 
of immense size.50 
Canada portrayed itself as a middle power leader: a country in a unique situation that 
allowed it to understand the positions of all sides: 
Finally, Canada thought, in cultural matters, that it was half-way between 
industrialized and developing countries, which enabled it to understand the 
                                                             
47 Canadian Delegation to the Extraordinary Joint Session of the Permanent Committee of the 
Berne Union and the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Universal Copyright Convention. 
Report of the Canadian delegation on the extraordinary joint session of the Permanent Committee 
of the Berne Union and the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Universal Copyright Convention, 
Paris, February 3 to 7, 1969. RG25 Vol. 10902 File 55-19-1-ICC Pt 1-1. 
48 Ibid. and Canadian Delegation to the Washington Meeting, Memorandum to the Minister: 
Report of the Canadian delegation at the Washington meeting, September 29–October 3/1969, 10 
October 1969: 2 and 4. Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada, RG19 Vol. 5574 File 8510–C785–1 
Part 2. 
49 Records of the Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention, Unesco House, 
Paris, 5 to 24 July 1971. Paris: Unesco, 1973; Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision 
of the Berne Convention (Paris, July 5 to 24, 1971). Geneva: World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 1974. 
50 Records of the Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention, Unesco House, 
Paris, 5 to 24 July 1971, 62. 
93 
problems of both and to foresee perhaps the possibility of reconciling the 
interests at stake.51 
Canada, however, did not sign the 1971 revision, and a rhetorical hint of Canada’s 
rethinking of the map of international copyright remained; the Canadian delegation 
declared, “We are all developing countries.”52  
The 1971 conferences resulted in revised texts of the Berne Convention and the 
Universal Copyright Convention that were widely accepted. At the same time, the crisis 
of 1967 had shown that copyright revision would no longer be easy. Following the 
1971 agreement, no further major revisions have been attempted. The 1971 text of the 
Berne Convention is still in force today, and formal country groupings, established 
under the UN system, have solidified political alignments on international copyright. 
Under this system, Canada is aligned as a part of Group B, the group of the most 
powerful countries.53  
III 
WHAT CONTRIBUTION DO MIDDLE POWERS MAKE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM TODAY?  
Mark Neufeld argues, drawing on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, that the middle 
power language that portrays Canada as an honest broker is used by dominant groups 
to advance and legitimise Canadian foreign policy and the existing international order. 
However, he also argues that the language of middlepowermanship has come to be 
used by dissident groups who, beginning in the late sixties and early seventies, recast 
the idea of a “middle power” “to signify the influence enjoyed by a country like 
Canada, and the potential such influence offers to effect radical progressive change in 
terms of disarmament, economic development and wealth re-distribution, 
environmental policy and democratization of the foreign policy-making process.”54  
Countries like Brazil, Argentina, and India are still pushing for changes in the 
international copyright system, and some would argue that Canada should play a part 
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in advocating for progressive change. A 2004 proposal to WIPO‘s General Assembly 
from a group of developing nations (Proposal By Argentina And Brazil for the 
Establishment of a Development Agenda For WIPO) raised issue with both the basic 
assumption that intellectual property protection contributes positively to international 
development, and WIPO‘s core mandate, which is “to promote the protection of 
intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States.”55  
This proposal sparked a series of high-profile international meetings at WIPO in 
which WIPO‘s mandate, impartiality, transparency, and core activities, as well as 
intellectual property’s contribution to international development, were broadly 
questioned. The meetings resulted in an agenda, approved by all member states, 
intended to make WIPO more transparent and responsive to the needs of developing 
countries. However, some of the original key proposals made by developing countries, 
such as a treaty on access to knowledge and an organizational restructuring at WIPO, 
were not included in the final agenda.  
In the discussions, Canada was aligned with the Group B of industrialized countries 
that opposed such radical proposals.56 Similarly, in discussions surrounding a World 
Blind Union proposal for a narrower treaty aimed at rectifying current shortages of 
accessible works for the visually impaired, Canada has been aligned with the major 
powers who have been hesitant to commit to a treaty, preferring other non-binding 
approaches.57 Canada’s emphasis during the discussions has been on the importance 
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of maintaining flexibility within any international instrument (whether binding or 
non-binding) for a variety of domestic approaches to ensuring access.58 
Since the 1970s Canada has been aligned with the major powers. In 1984 the 
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the Department of 
Communications jointly prepared the paper From Gutenberg to Telidon: a White 
Paper on Copyright, issued as part of a public consultation on copyright reform, and 
set down the path that Canada would follow: 
Since Canadian creators receive national treatment protection in [countries 
that are Canada’s major trading partners and who belong to one or both of 
the major copyright conventions], they benefit from Canada’s participation 
in these conventions. The government intends that Canada’s international 
obligations be met in the spirit as well as in the letter of the law.59 
This philosophy has generally guided Canadian participation in international 
copyright agreements since 1984. As in 1928, when Canadian delegates were 
instructed to support any proposals that seemed likely to meet general approval of the 
governments represented, “particularly those of the leading countries, such as Great 
Britain, Italy and France”60, Canada today adopts the view that it must align on 
important issues with its largest trading partners.  
Canada is now, more than ever before, an active participant in the coalition of most 
powerful copyright exporters on matters of international copyright. Objections to and 
scepticism surrounding the appropriateness of Canada’s participation in the Berne 
Convention have been replaced with this Canadian version of a trade-based approach 
to international copyright. Support for counter-hegemonic projects has been held at 
bay by a vision of a Canada associated with the major powers.  
Change in international copyright is not impossible. Other countries like India, South 
Africa, Brazil and Argentina have been successfully enrolled by domestic and 
transnational interests to advocate change within the international copyright system; 
room for exceptions, such as the 1971 Appendix to the Berne Convention, which, 
though labelled “unworkable”, has been achieved; and copyright treaties that would 
advocate greater access to knowledge are even now being considered.  
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Such initiatives and visions press against the great weight of inscribed associations, 
norms, expertise, authority, institutions, and resources of a Union that has been in 
place since 1886. Such initiatives and visions are based in a hope that the regime of 
international copyright might be transformed, might overcome the exclusions of its 
past, and might embed this overcoming at the core of its ongoing practices. It is only 
by forming an awareness of the material and discursive structures of international 
copyright – an awareness that is formed by examining the historical experiences of 
weaker countries and groups as well as the views of the stronger ones – that such a 
transformative commitment can be made. 
 
 
